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ABSTRACT

“A Complicated Story, an Unsolved Mystery”:
An Experiment in Poetry and the Ethics of Representation
by
Darren P. Wood
Advisor: Siraj Ahmed

The New York Juvenile Asylum, founded in 1851, was one of New York’s first institutional
responses to the problems associated with the poor. It, and the theories of asylum that undergird
the institution, still exist today in the form of Children’s Village. The location of Children’s
Village, located just a few hundred yards from my home, prompted me to consider the distance
between my family and the children who reside at Children’s Village; between my historical
context and that of the children who resided at the New York Juvenile Asylum - and their parents
who surrendered them there; and between my situation and theirs, bridgeable or unbridgeable
through my capacity for empathy and imagination. This project attempts to understand and
deepen my relationship to the children surrendered to the New York Juvenile Asylum and their
parents by: considering the theory of the ethics of representation in literature; researching the
historical and theoretical context for the New York Juvenile Asylum; and crafting a series of
poems in the persona of the children surrendered to the New York Juvenile Asylum and their
parents.
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Introduction
At the heart of this project are the persona poems, a series written in the persona of the
children who resided at the New York Juvenile Asylum in its early years of mid-nineteenth
century New York and of the parents who surrendered them there. The shape and sequence the
capstone takes resembles the shape and sequence of my learning: first, my inquiries into the
ethics of representation, which I had to embark upon in order to feel authorized to write the
poems I would; second, the historical and theoretical context in which the children and parents
were situated and represented that allowed me to imagine their experience in detail. After the
poems exist a section in which I reflect on the capstone and sketch its future incarnation. I write
here always as a father and with the keen awareness, made concrete by my geographic proximity
to the current incarnation of the New York Juvenile Asylum, of the distances, sometimes slight,
and sometimes huge, between us all.
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On the Ethics of Representation
A Series of Anecdotes to Manifest the Problems of Representation
In 2017, the white artist Dana Schutz contributed to the Whitney Biennial a painting,
“Open Casket,” that depicted the image of Emmett Till’s disfigured face, based on the infamous
1955 photograph from his funeral. Within hours of the show’s opening, the inclusion of the
painting had provoked a strong critical response. The painter Hannah Black wrote an open letter
objecting to the painting, arguing: “The painting should not be acceptable to anyone who cares or
pretends to care about Black people because it is not acceptable for a white person to transmute
Black suffering into profit and fun.” The painting remained in the Biennial, though the artist has
since removed the painting from circulation and stored it in her private collection. Nevertheless
the episode provoked a number of questions: Who is allowed to represent historical experience in
art? How should an artist’s identity affect their right to represent? And to what degree should the
right to represent be determined by public opinion?
In 2018, Anders Carlson-Wee published a poem in The Nation, a 14-line poem that
attempted to make visible the labor that homeless people expend to make themselves inoffensive
- even invisible - on the street. The poem was quickly and roundly criticized for its blunt
depiction of its homeless speaker and its use of African-American Vernacular English. In a series
of tweets the writer Roxane Gay, wrote, “Don’t use AAVE. Don’t even try it. Know your lane.”
Who is allowed to write in a voice and dialect different from their own? To what degree is the
sophistication or aesthetic quality of the work of art relevant to the question of the right of the
artist to make that art?
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In 2003, in his collection, What Narcissism Means to Me, Tony Hoagland published the
poem “The Change,” in which a white speaker recounts a tennis match between two female
tennis players, one white, one black, and employs the unmodified language of stereotype.
that big black girl from Alabama,
cornrowed hair and Zulu bangles on her arms,
some outrageous name like Vondella Aphrodite

and
I couldn't help wanting
the white girl to come out on top,
because she was one of my kind, my tribe,
with her pale eyes and thin lips

The rhetorical purpose of the use of stereotype is to draw critical attention to an insidiously
expressed racism by white people who would not characterize themselves necessarily as racist.
Claudia Rankine criticized the poem and recounted at an AWP conference her heated
conversation about the poem with her colleague Hoagland; her chief critique was that while the
poem presented this white speaker’s racism in order to critique it, it did critique it explicitly
enough. One of the discomforts readers have since had with the poem is the resemblance
between the poet and the persona that delivers the poem. Does a poet have the right to employ
problematic personas? On what grounds can we evaluate whether the poem sufficiently
challenges that persona? Is a poet justified in constructing a problematic persona in order to
make observations about problems - racism or misogyny, for example - within their own
character? How should an artist calculate and take into account the particular asymmetrical
power relationships between themselves and their subjects?
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These anecdotes intend to illustrate the uncertain terrain on which writers - particularly
writers who have accrued a disproportionate amount of power because of their identities - find
themselves when writing about people whose identities and experiences are different from their
own and raises many essential questions I hope to respond to in this project: Who gets to speak
about and for historical figures? Under what particular conditions? As I construct a series of
persona poems, I am interested to see if I can synthesize philosophy and theory into an ethics of
representation that clarifies - and perhaps justifies - my agenda.
The problems that a sound ethics of representation should address and respond to are
manifold, but I have attempted to organize them into three different categories: the first category
addresses ways in which the meaning of representation is produced socially and discursively; a
second category reflects on the aesthetic quality of the representation; and a third category
considers the ethics of literary empathy.

On Representation as a Form of Discourse
Contemporary political discourse daily illustrates the impact that a speaker’s identity and
positionality have on the meaning of what they say. As the philosopher Linda Alcoff observes,
“a speaker’s location (which I take here to refer to their social location, or social identity) has an
epistemically significant impact on that speaker’s claims and can serve either to authorize or
disauthorize one’s speech” (Alcoff, 7). She notes, in addition, that “certain privileged locations
are discursively dangerous. In particular, the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on
behalf of less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or
reinforcing the oppression of the group spoken for” (7). Had Carlson-Wee identified as black, his
poem might have been criticized for its clumsy handling of dialect, its able-ist language, its

4

limited imagination of the experience of homeless - in other words, the criticism might have
focused solely on aesthetic or formal deficiencies in the poem - but his poem might not have
been understood to have violated an ethic of representation: that he was categorically unfit to
represent black American experience - or “Black suffering” - to borrow Hannah Black’s phrase.
Carlson-Wee’s intentions, “to address the invisibility of homelessness” (Schuessler)
could not redeem the poem. For an author’s intentions - the meanings they desire their
representation to produce - might be less relevant than the reception and re-production of those
intentions and meanings by a critical readership. If meaning is produced discursively, the author
shares with their audience the responsibility for producing the meaning of the work. Acts of
speaking are situations that are always attended by a speaker and listener, situations which
Alcoff names “rituals of speaking” (Alcoff, 12): “Rituals of speaking are politically constituted
by power relations of domination, exploitation, and subordination. Who is speaking, who is
spoken of, and who listens is a result, as well as an act, of political struggle. Simply put, the
discursive context is a political arena” (Alcoff, 15). These rituals are contests, waged on uneven
ground.
If meaning is produced discursively - if it is a fundamentally social and communal
activity, one which we can imagine is sometimes convivial and sometimes critical - then what
responsibility does an author have for the texts they might author, the meanings they intend, the
texts they enter into circulation? If an author might not be responsible for the meaning a listener
constructs, can they nevertheless be held accountable for the meaning a listener constructs? And
what is the ethic that might govern their creation and circulation of texts? How can we
simultaneously acknowledge the discursive production of meaning while making writers and
readers accountable for producing meaning responsibly?
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These critiques of a writer’s right to represent have their own limits, however. As Alcoff
observes, to object to a writer’s right to speak for another, simply based on their identity,
assumes that the speaker’s - and subject’s identities- are singular, rather than multiple and
overlapping. To critique a white writer for representing a black subject - to argue that such an act
is categorically an abuse of power - might ignore that the white writer identifies, also, as queer,
as a writer writing in a non-native language, or as any multiple identities that might complicate
the power differential between writer and subject. Tony Hoagland makes this point dryly in his
letter to Rankine, in which he simultaneously acknowledges and complicates his identity: “of
course I am racist; and sexist, a homophobe, a classist, a liberal, a middle-class American, a
college graduate, a drop-out, an egotist, Diet Pepsi drinker, a Unitarian, a fool, a Triple A
member, a citizen of Texas, a lover of women, a teacher, a terrible driver, and a single mother.”
For Alcoff, too, flinching from the difficulty and potential harm involved in representing
others, to “retreat from speaking,” in her formulation, might itself represent a problematic
cowardice that preserves power for the privileged writer: “a retreat from speaking for ... may
result merely in a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a privileged person takes no
responsibility for her society whatsoever” (Alcoff, 17). Kathleen Lundeen, a literary scholar,
notes that this retreat from speaking for would mean that writers could only speak for
themselves, producing volumes of metaphor and autobiography, extending themselves and their
readers only to understand more deeply their own experience:
[I]f we were to insist on shared identity in all areas, writers would only be fit to represent themselves, and
readers, to understand representations of themselves. By this logic, autobiography would emerge as the
sole legitimate creative genre, and it would be suitable only for a readership of one: its author. ( 83)

Furthermore, Alcoff notes that avoiding speaking for others represents a damaging and wilfully
ignorant position, akin to the formulation that some offer, that they “do not see race”: “there is
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no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one’s words do not prescriptively affect or
mediate the experience of others” (Alcoff, 17).
To resolve these quandaries, Alcoff proposes a shift in the geometry between writer and
subject, from one of speaking for to one of speaking with: “[w]e should strive to create wherever
possible the conditions for dialogue and the practice of speaking with and to rather than speaking
for others” (Alcoff, 23). In political or ethical realms, this different geometry appeals, suggestive
of a more equitable social relationship, like one found in participatory ethnography. But in
literature, what would this geometry look like? How could literature shift from witness or
representation to dialogue, speaking with a fictional or historical subject rather than for them? I
can leave this only as a clearer articulation of I inhabit in this project.

On Aesthetics as Ethics
Poets like to insist on craft as a defining characteristic of poetry: that its devices of sound
and meaning, its traditions and forms, all indicate a quality of care by the writer that set it apart
from other genres. Some of the theorists I read suggest that the quality of a poem’s aesthetics
might justify its representation of its subject. What might be the standards for craft and aesthetic
that might help to distinguish work that achieves an ethic of representation and work that does
not?
The poet and professor Natasha Saje articulates a few ethical principles concerning the
representation of others. She quotes Wislawa Szymborska’s poem about 9/11 and the people who
leapt from the World Trade Center towers to their deaths, and the constraints a poet must impose
on themselves in representing these victims: “I can only do two things for them -/describe this
flight//and not add a last line” (Szymborska in Saje). The poet’s responsibility begins and ends in
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describing or witnessing their tragic death, but cannot extend to offering a comment, imposing
their point of view, imposing their ego’s desire to make meaning of another’s suffering,
“add[ing] a last line.” But this principle seems inadequate: even a last line whose function in the
poem is merely descriptive still necessarily plays a rhetorical function in the poem. The line
conveys perhaps a sonic resonance, it resolves a tension in the poem, it comments on the rest of
the poem through implication. Even the line Saje quotes from Szymborska employs the image of
the people falling to their deaths to complete the meaning implied by “not add a last line.” And
the selection of the imagery, the framing of image within the context of the poem, the decision to
make the poem in the first place, all indicate the poet has done more than merely describe. In this
sense, all lines in a poem about a victim of a tragedy function rhetorically and comment on the
subject.
If withholding is proposed as an ethic that might legitimize the representation of others,
so, too, is describing. Saje suggests that depth of representation might sufficiently justify a
person’s right and desire to represent: “Ethical difficulty arises when poets write about subjects
superficially” (Saje). The poet Philip B. Williams, writing about Ai, a poet celebrated for her
wide-ranging and challenging persona poems, suggests that Ai succeeds where other persona
poets might fail because Ai’s poems demonstrate her interest in the facets of her personas; her
poems speak to a “unique distinction or particular aspect in a problem,” rather than a “facade,” or
“misrepresentation intended to conceal something uncomfortable or unpleasant.” These terms
that Saje and Williams employ do not particularly satisfy, though: that poets not write
“superficially” seems simultaneously quite obvious as an aspiration (particularly for the poet!)
and entirely subjective; and “unique” or “particular” do not offer much more than “not
superficial” does.
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Williams begins to carve out perhaps more satisfying categories for analysis when
writing about “forgoing the obvious” in favor of the “moral ambiguity” in Ai’s persona poems and what trouble that ambiguity causes for the poems’ readers. Williams writes, “She refuses to
go for the easy idea of a situation or the expected stereotype of her chosen voice” (emphasis
mine); the implication, according to Williams, is that “Ai’s ambivalence toward everyone in the
poem allows for a second culprit … to arise: you as the reader”:
The persona poem demands not just the (re)telling and satisfaction of predetermined audience
expectations, but a revision of how one sees and imagines both actions and the people committing said
actions. Otherwise, the poem risks falling into stereotype, moralizing, and empathy, the latter potentially
catering to a voyeuristic desire to experience others’ lives without having to take on the risks and burdens
of those lives, even the ones we imagine.

And this standard of transcending expectations in ways that force the reader to implicate and
trouble themselves seems in many ways a credible way by which we might evaluate the ethics of
representation in a persona poem: if it acknowledges that meaning is socially produced, is aware
of the stereotypes that readers might bring to the persona in the poem, and finds a way to trouble
and complicate those social expectations in ways that are “risky,” even “burdensome,” in
productive ways.
One of the problems here, however, is that the terms of Williams’ ethics are on the one
hand overspecified and on the other hand underspecified. The terms are overspecified in that the
responsibility of a persona poem is to create a drama for the reader, in which they reconceive of
their own stereotypes of the character in the poem; the reader, according to this ethic, is
foregrounded and the subject of the poem is relegated to the background. The terms are
underspecified in that the subject of the poem need not be accurately described, or deeply
imagined, provided the representation of the subject transforms and grows the reader, provided
the character in the poem exists in for the reader to make profitable use of it.
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Techniques of metafiction might offer a way toward an ethic. Returning to Saje’s
thinking about Szymborska’s 9/11 poem, her praise for the poem as it acknowledges its limits,
the boundaries it won’t cross, I wish to highlight the way in which the poem’s recognition of the
author’s activity, the trace of the effort of the poet to make meaning of another’s experience,
might productively complicate the power asymmetry between writer and subject.
Saje writes, “poems that deal with the lives of others need to show an awareness … that
another person is always a complicated story, an unsolved mystery” and perhaps a responsible
and ethical aesthetic necessarily names the author’s inadequacy, the fallacy of their representing
an experience that is beyond their own:
Moreover, all writing begins in ignorance and separation; the writer is trying to know someone else, trying
to understand someone else’s point of view through the act of writing. My point is that the finished
poem’s success can be measured by the thoroughness of the poet’s understanding, or sometimes the
admission of failure.

The goal of the poet should be “representing human subjects in their humanity, while remaining
conscious of their own blind spots.” Posited here is that metafictive elements - aspects of a poem
that draw the reader’s attention to the fact of the poem, the presence of the writer, the traces of
their labor, their role, and their failures - make visible the problems of the poem for the poet. The
reader is culpable, the writer, too, and in this way establishes the possibility of an honestly
problematic relationship to the represented subject. The poet’s limits might produce the subject
more fully alive and human.

On the Ethics of Literary Empathy
When considering the ethical merits of representation in literature, theorists often
evaluate the degree of empathy the writer has exercised for their subjects. Two theorists, in
particular, help illuminate my thinking about the empathetic relationship between subject
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(whether the reader or author of a text) and object of representation (the character or persona
depicted in the text.
As Lundeen frames the conceptual problem, empathy involves an essential contradiction
involving proximity and distance between reader and character, writer and subject. She writes,
The ethical dilemma inherent in empathy - forever finding oneself either too close or not close enough to
the object of self-identification - is inherent in language itself, which embodies a self-contradictory
dynamic. Every verbal act is essentially solitary in that it is initiated by an individual; it is recognized as
language, however, only by consensus - that is, only if it is already understood by the listener or reader.
Though language is a means of individuation, its materials come from a communally owned source.” (91,
emphasis mine)

And
Empathy, in essence, is an ideal of differentiated union with another, and that paradox should remind us
that in literature, as in life, there are shared borders of identity that we are compelled to recognize but
cannot cross. (92)

Empathy is an irresolvable contradiction between impulses to similarity and to difference that are
inherent in a language that is necessarily both private and public. Applied to the question of
ethical representation in persona poetry, then, the problem is double-edged: Either the empathetic
reader or writer establishes a relationship predicated on similarity that consumes or obscures the
subject; or the reader or writer establishes a relationship predicated on difference that alienates
the subject as irresolvably different.
Emmanuel Levinas similarly address the first part of the problem that Lundeen observes:
that the subject can totally subsume the object of representation by incorporating them fully into
their own paradigm of understanding. A kind of possession - a colonization of the subject by the
writer and reader - concerns Levinas, who writes:
The immanence of the known to the act of knowing is already the embodiment of seizure. This ... belongs
to that unit of knowledge in which Auffassen (understanding) is also, and always has been, a Fassen
(gripping). (“Ethics as First Philosophy,” 76)

11

Concerned critically with a tradition in phenomenology, particularly as articulated by his former
teacher Martin Heidegger, Levinas contends that understanding the other necessarily interpolates
that other into a system of understanding in which the other is mastered and subjugated.
Interestingly, the poet Williams offers another point of view. He does not identify the
writer’s capacity to consume, through ego, imagination, or understanding, the subject as a
problem, but as an asset. Writing about the persona poet Ai, Williams contends:
Regardless of the age, gender, occupation, religion, or other unique qualities of her speakers, Ai makes
sure that as she moves through her speaker’s psychology her imagination is at the front … Her personas
are simply facets of herself as a multi-bladed human being. ( Part I)

The spatial metaphor is interesting: Ai moves through the speaker’s presumably static
psychology; foregrounded is the writer’s imaginative capacity and her being, not the subject’s.
For some, empathy exists only as a paradox; for others, an act of colonization. Can we
conceive of an empathy that can permit a writer and reader to identify with the experience of the
subject without seizing it in service of the writer’s imaginative representation?
Writing about historians, the philosopher Gayatri Spivak describes an empathy that
suspends the writer’s consciousness:
the historian must suspend (as far as possible) the clamor of his or her own consciousness (or
consciousness-effect, as operated by disciplinary training), so that the elaboration of the insurgency,
packaged with an insurgent-consciousness, does not freeze into an 'object of investigation', or, worse yet,
a model for imitation. (82)

If the writer is able to “suspend the clamor of his or her own consciousness,” conditions
are set for an encounter with the Other - an encounter in which the writer could accept the ethical
responsibility imposed upon him by the Other, a “responsibility that goes beyond what I may or
may not have done to the Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were
devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself [… o]r more exactly, as if I had to
answer for the other’s death even before being” (Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” 83).
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Responding to this profound responsibility to the Other would necessarily overcome the writer’s
ability to master the Other into their own interpretive framework, their own representation
schema, their own meaning-making paradigm. The Other, in fact, would implicate the writer:
“The Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for
me, begs for me, and in doing so recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question” (Levinas,
Ethics as First Philosophy, 83). This moment would surpasses the subject’s capacity to master
the object, the writer’s capacity to even represent:
Responsibility for the other, this way of answering without a prior commitment, is human fraternity itself,
and it is prior to freedom. The face of the other in proximity, which is more than representation, is an
unrepresentable trace, the way of the infinite” (Levinas, Substitution, 106)

An ethical representation would make the writer vulnerable to the Other in close
proximity. In Levinas’s words, “Relation is proximity, and this closeness subjects the witness to
the possibility of being wounded” (quoted in Forché). The theorist and poet Claudia Rankine
attributes a similar theory of vulnerability to Judith Butler in her letter response to Hoagland’s
poem:
Not long ago I was in a room where someone asked the philosopher Judith Butler what made language
hurtful. I could feel everyone lean forward. Our very being exposes us to the address of another, she said.
We suffer from the condition of being addressable, by which she meant, I believe, there is no avoiding the
word-filled sticks and stones of others. Our emotional openness, she added, is borne, in both its meanings,
by our addressability. Language navigates this.

So one theoretical proposition regarding the ethics of representation is to construct a
representation that does not master or consume the represented object into a paradigm of the
subject’s own making, but that recognizes the subject’s essential “unrepresentability,” a
recognition that produces for the writer a moment when the writer is implicated, a moment of
“wound,” of “vulnerability.”
If the writer is implicated in their own representation of the other, then the spatial
relationship between the two is troubled in productive ways. Empathy is not made impossible
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because it is only conceived as total difference or total similarity, nor is it made impossible
because it is conceived of as an act of totalizing substitution, but empathy can be conceived of as
a dialectic. The action from the subject toward the object has produced a reaction; the dynamic
has become complicated, the possibility for mastery of the object diminished, the possibility for
vulnerability for the subject increased. This paradox is echoed in Lundeen’s thinking that
empathy is a “condition of sympathy and alienation”: “to put it another way, empathy manifests
the apparent affinity one person has with another, but in so doing it magnifies the differences
between them” (Lundeen, 90).

My Ethics of Representation
What I have endeavored to reveal in the section above is that my reading of the literature
on the ethics of representation and empathy neither resolves nor clarifies; some contradiction, it
seems, remain. So I endeavor here essentially to clarify the irresolvable tensions inherent in the
act of representation, to make those tensions visible. Thus my attempt to synthesize below these
tensions, an act which feels futile yet necessary - staking out the uncertain terms on which I can
feel authorized and able to write - mirrors formally the contradictory and paradoxical nature of
these ethics: they are declarations of uncertainty.
● Making art requires total freedom. Total freedom means total responsibility: the artist
must be able to justify totally their choice to represent ONE thing from among ALL
OTHER things.
● Making art is a social activity and must, therefore, be aware of asymmetrical power
dynamics between the artist and the subject, artist and audience, and how those dynamics
contribute to the production of the meaning of the art.
● Choosing NOT to make art - to leave room for others, to not speak for others - is
occasionally the only (ir)responsible choice to make (choosing not to respond to or
represent the subject, to be irresponsible, is, in some cases, the greatest responsibility).
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● Art can cause trouble - for the artist, the audience. “But surely it is both morally and
politically objectionable to structure one’s actions around the desire to avoid criticism.”
(Alcoff, 22)
● Literature asks for great readers, sensitive to the differences between the author and their
speakers and narrators, to the author’s rhetorical use of voice, dialect - but does not
always get them. Writers have to lean into the trouble that comes back to them.
● On geometries: get them right. The act of representation is not the act of substitution (the
writer for the subject), and empathy has a limit. Does the writer speak for, through, or to
their subject?
● A persona poem should be researched. Research is insufficient. A persona poem should
be imagined. Imagination is (also) insufficient.
● The subject, like the human, is like nothing else other than what it is. The writer must
represent in service of original print.
● The writer must open themselves up to the possibility of being implicated, wounded,
written by their subject.
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An Historical and Theoretical Context for the New York Juvenile Asylum
Historical Forces that Produced Poverty in Mid-Nineteenth Century New York City
If part of my responsibility here is to represent the subjects related to the New York
Juvenile Asylum, I endeavor here to understand better their lived reality and to establish the
historical and theoretical context in which these subjects were situated and produced.
Mid-nineteenth century New York City is in many ways hard to imagine, the level of
poverty and its effects being so high. Illness and disease threatened the welfare of the poor:
“Between 1850 and 1860 more than half of those under the age of five died each year - seven of
every ten under the age of two” (Burrows and Wallace, 790). Perhaps these mortality rates
should not shock as they do, in light of the environment in which people lived:
Overcoming sometimes violent resistance by impoverished owners, the police flushed five to six thousand
pigs out of cellars and garrets and drove an estimated twenty thousand swine north to the upper wards
that summer. (At the same time, in an exterminating frenzy spurred by municipal bounties, 3.520 stray
dogs were killed in the streets, mostly by small boys with clubs. (786)

National and global conditions intensified poverty and its effects on children in New York City.
The Civil War claimed lives, divorce and family desertion rates increased, 1.2 million
immigrants fled the effects of the Potato Famine in Ireland between 1847 and 1854, and 11
million working class immigrants arrived from Europe between 1870 and 1900 (Nelson, 3). The
conditions in which poor New Yorkers lived and died unfolded in public view; there was no such
thing as a private life for the poor, who lived in streets, stoops, staircases, or corridors (Mandler,
10). The public presence of poverty and an international recognition that “the traditional and
accepted forms of correction and control of the deviant [had become] ineffective or disreputable”
(Rothman, xxii) shaped how the city responded to its deviant poor. One famous example of the
city’s response was its forcible eviction from what would become Central Park of over one
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thousand residents, “[t]he sixteen hundred or so Irish Germans, and blacks who lived on the land
- dismissed and disparaged as ‘vagabonds or scoundrels’” (Burrows and Wallace, 792).

The Upper-Class Experienced the Poor as Threatening Locally and Nationally
While poor and vulnerable New Yorkers lived in intensely challenging conditions,
middle- and upper-class New Yorkers responded to those conditions with an intensity
approaching hysteria, describing the poor and their environments with physical imagery
suggestive of a mortal threat to the city. The Reverend Edwin H. Chapin in 1853 described
visiting slums and seeing a “swimming mist of hideous transactions and hideous faces,” “pools
dark with undistinguishable horrors,” and “masses of people ‘matted together in the very offal of
debasement’” (Boyer, 89). And lawmakers seemed assured the New York City was fatally
endangered by its slums:
Legislators investigating conditions in Corlear’s Hook worried that the cancerous horrors of the slums
were spreading relentlessly through New York’s ‘veins and arteries.’ If nothing were done, they continued,
‘the heart and limbs of the city will sooner or later suffer, as surely as the vitals of the human system must
suffer by the poisoning or disease of the smallest vehicle.’ (Burrows and Wallace, 774)

Charles Loring Brace, a social reformer and philanthropist later credited with founding the
modern foster care movement, described the threat in 1872 in epic terms: “we should see an
explosion from this class which might leave this city in ashes and flood” (Boyer, 97).
For some, the possibility that the poor might “poison” the city was not as threatening as
the possibility that the poor might organize and gain influence and power, as in Boyer’s account
of the position of a New York physician and public-health reformer in 1843: “‘The outcasts of
society’ were beginning to ‘form societies of their own,’ warned Dr. John H. Griscom …
‘thereby debasing ‘the character of the community of which they are a part’” (90). Brace seems
to have shared this fear of the collective power of the poor: “Rather the danger Brace emphasized
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was their potential for destructive collective action. ‘Herding together,’ he wrote of the origins of
street gangs, they soon ‘form an unconscious society’ - and then trouble begins” (Boyer, 96).
If poverty was believed to threaten the society of New York City, it was also believed to
threaten the national society and character of America. The head of the Association for
Improving the Condition of the Poor, Robert Hartley, felt that “urban poverty was (1) a massive
threat to social stability and (2) the direct consequence of individual moral depravity” (Boyer,
89). Displaced children - the orphan, the child beggar, the vagrant, the truant - figured
significantly in America’s imagination of the threat the poor posed to their country. Claudia
Nelson, the literary theorist, describes the paradoxical relationship the United States has had with
the orphan:
The United States has long presented itself both as self-made orphan (it celebrates every year the
anniversary of the severing of its relationship with the mother country) and as adoptive parent to
countless immigrants (4)

She goes on to argue that “[t]he real ‘work’ of child placement, from the child-saver’s point of
view, was the salvation of America itself” (Nelson, 30). The visceral terms used to describe the
poor in New York City and the symbolic import assigned the orphan suggest the high stakes at
the time associated with responding to the problem of poor children in New York City.

Psychic Reasons the Upper Classes Wanted to Institutionalize Poor Children
What was at stake in the problem of the poor in New York City was not only the
improvement of their condition but the representation of their condition, in ways that served
middle-class attitudes and needs. Middle- and upper-class New Yorkers contributed to a
representation of the poor in starkly different terms from themselves in order to affirmed their
self-identity and social standing.
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The historian Paul Boyer observes the paradoxical nature of the role the poor were meant
to serve in the imagination of wealthier citizens: “The urban poor were singled out as both cause
and victim of a frightening array of moral and social evils” (86). Frightening, though, those evils
might have been, they also made for alluring theater, drawing the inquisitive eyes of wealthier
New Yorkers who could confer upon the poor their attention and pity. In 1852, the Ladies’ Home
Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church purchased the Old Brewery, a tenement
rookery, in order to demolish and replace it:
“To dramatize its demolition, the LHMS ran candle-lit tours of the rookery’s fetid interior, ‘where
miserable men, women, and children … moodily submitted to the gaze of the strangers in that community
of degraded outcasts.’” (Burrows and Wallace, 775)

If the condition of the poor drew the attention and critique of New York’s middle-class
and elite, their child-rearing practices drew even more condemnation. This condemnation served
the middle class in their effort to clarify and affirm the identity and values of middle class New
Yorkers: “Reformers maligned the parenting practices of poor parents in order to refine the
image of their own parenting practices” (Bellingham, 127). Even though placing children out
with family members or employers where they could learn trades was a common practice among
working- and middle-class families, the practice was challenged by those parents who recently
had gained the financial security necessary to suspend this practice themselves. Middle class
parents, who recently had found security in society that allowed them to avoid “discontinuities in
the care of their own children[,] imputed reprehensible motives” to parents who could not
(Bellingham, 124).
In fact, central to this myth of the reprehensible parent was the notion of abandonment:
the image of the destitute, perhaps drunk or immoral parent, surrendering children to their fate on
the street occupied a central role in the narrative produced about the poor. And while the
archives of the New York Juvenile Asylum do document instances of abandonment, they also
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document many instances of more benign surrender: surrender because children were caught
pilfering, throwing stones, were not obedient, or - in many cases - were hoping to be fed, clothed,
and taught, so that they could find productive employment. The sociologist Bruce Bellingham
“found that the problem of neglectful, abandoning parenting was substantially made up” (125).
Nelson also documents the Children’s Aid Society’s practice of “manufacturing orphans”:
Brace found it expedient to define such children as anti-children, their families (if families they had) as
anti-families: as he remarks, ‘[their] ways are not our ways.’ Le Roy Ashby has documented the Society’s
commitment to ‘manufactur[ing]’ orphans’ both by downplaying children’s existing family ties and by
representing even concerned parents as depraved (Children 44 - 48). When the child’s family, and even
the child itself, were the objects of fear rather than of sentiment, the question of placement took on a
new meaning. (Nelson, 21)

Rather than morally depraved, resource deprived families routinely turned to surrender as a
rational response to the insoluble problems they encountered:
The evidence of the midcentury Children’s Aid Society records suggest that surrenders were, for the most
part, rational family responses to normal if unpredictable economic and demographic constraints or
mechanisms to negotiate a transition from the status of dependent child to semiautonomous youth
(Bellingham, 139)

If the cruelty of the situation poor New Yorkers found themselves in was not enough, it seems
doubly cruel that they should be subjected to criticism for a common and rational response to
their situation. But this criticism was central to the middle-class project of clarifying and
legitimizing their system of value: “Child saving helped crystallize a middle-class ideology that
stigmatized these sorts of adaptive family strategies” (Bellingham, 149)

The Asylum Represented a Material and Ideological Approach to Disciplining Poor Children
Even if the motives of representing these poor families and their strategies for dealing
with poverty were suspect, the problem itself - children whose families could not, because of
illness, death, shifting economic conditions, inconsistent employment, or persistent
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underearning, provide stable care, food, housing, and schooling to them - was not. And in the
mid-nineteenth century New York a variety of charitable institutions arose to respond to this
“problem of poverty,” the asylum, among them.
The professor of social medicine, David Rothman, describes a number of reasons
America and Europe settled on the strategy of isolation from familial context and confinement as
the primary response to “deviant and dependent” children: “incarceration became the prime
mechanism for punishment and treatment,” due to changing appetites for and attitudes toward
capital or corporal punishment (xxix); and the “permeability of eighteenth-century institutions
gave way to sealed-off space” (xxix). Not only did changing conceptions of punishment and
incarceration contribute to the birth of the asylum, but a wider shift in the faith Americans had in
social organizations turned them to the asylum:
Jacksonian Americans experienced a crisis of confidence in the social organization of the new republic,
fearful that the ties that once bound citizens together - the ties of community, church, and family - were
loosening and that, as a consequence, social disorganization appeared imminent … In response to these
perceptions … they discovered the solution of the asylum (Rothman, xxiv)

If disorganization was the problem, radical organization must be the solution, and the program of
the asylum represented a concerted adherence to the idea that “a dedication to the principles of
work and of solitude, of steady labor and of isolation” (Rothman, xxix) could reform the deviant.
This dedication to these principles was exhaustive: “ the asylum presented the need to ‘construct
from nothing a new social laboratory in which the whole of human existence could be
programmed’” (Castel in Rothman, xxxi). The literature of the New York Juvenile Asylum put it
even more explicitly:
We do not believe … in the mawkish, sentimental and infidel philosophy of modern days, which discards
the Bible method of disciplining the child into obedience. … It is manifest that but little good can be
effected with all our appliances, unless order and obedience to established rules are vigilantly
maintained… (Rothman, 214)
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This privileging of obedience and order had its roots not only in a cultural response to
changes social context but in domestic ideas of what parents and children should be and do.
The ideal mother in child-rearing literature was strict but loving, ever affectionate with her brood, but
always successful in commanding their absolute obedience. … Much of the child-rearing literature
instructed fathers to keep somewhat aloof from their children, lest they compromise their ultimate
authority. (Rothman, 219)

This theory of parenting, when extended to the asylum, translated into significantly more
draconian and severe terms. Describing The New York House of Refuge, Rothman wrote:
Terry argued that the best method for checking disobedient inmates was ‘to take the largest and worst
boy in the concern and make an example of him, which we did by hand-cuffing him in the presence of
several others … and sent him to be locked up on Bread and Water for a while (Rothman, 233)

The purpose of the charitable response to the poor might have been to instill the
seemingly essential virtues of order and obedience. But these virtues had a strong ideological
valence. One of the tacit goals of the charitable response to the poor was to impress their middleclass and elite values upon them. Rothman notes that “almost all the institutions … confined the
lower orders of society” (Rothman, xxx) and Boyer observes that “[t]he AICP [Association for
the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor] represented an institutional mechanism for
transmitting the values of the city’s middle and upper strata downward into the ranks of the
poor” (92). Boyer also notes that “the prominent object [of the New York Juvenile Asylum] has
been … to clothe the Institution as far as possible with those hallowed associations which usually
cluster about home” (94), a middle-class home with all its domestic sensibilities and virtues.
A second ideological objective of the asylum was to transform the children of the poor
into productive members of a capitalist economy. The New York Juvenile Asylum applied
stringent methods for instilling discipline in the children who resided there, so that they could
develop “self-discipline of body, mind, and heart and then [be apprenticed] to employers”
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(Burrows and Wallace, 780). Brace of the Children’s Aid Society named the capitalistic goals of
its work even more starkly:
Brace also admired the ‘independence and manly vigor’ of the newsboys, suggested they might be little
business man in the making - if only they could be instilled with a ‘sense of propriety’ and the desire of
accumulation, which, economists tell us, is the base of all civilization.” (Burrows and Wallace, 782 - 783)

The third ideological objective of the asylum was to assimilate its children into American
ideologies and virtues. Reformers’ shared concerns about the asylum’s earlier incarnation, the
house of reform and orphanage, which made children “regimented, repressed, and deprived of
family life,” characteristics that opposed and could undermine American principles (Nelson, 3).
And for Brace, as he described in his Short Sermons to News Boys in 1866, the project of the
charitable response to the poor was to inculcate in children Christian virtues, which would
nourish the American soil.
Our great effort was to put these poor creatures - the vagrants, the houseless, the needy and criminal,
and the uncared-for children of the great cities, where they could be most easily reached by Christian
influence … the hopeful field was evidently among the young. There, crime might possibly be checked in
its very beginnings, and the seed of future good character and order and virtue by widely sown. (quoted
in Nelson, 22).

Brace championed the practice of sending the children of the poor in the crowded cities of the
Northeast to work for farmers in the West, sharing a popular belief at the time that the
characteristics that would redeem the nation, characteristics of thrift, hard work, and selfsufficiency were most likely to be found in the soils of the West: “The institution would sow the
seeds, declared the New York Juvenile Asylum, and leave their cultivation to others” (Rothman,
224 - 225).
The language is telling: children were conceived of as seeds so that they could then be
farmed into plants. The language does not assign a great deal of autonomy or agency to the
children (what if they did not wish to become plants?). Reflecting on the role of the children in
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the research I read, secondary and archival, and in the writing I have done here, I am struck by
their essential passivity and voicelessness. Rothman describes bluntly the lack of regard the
administrators of asylums paid to the rights of the child: “Its administrators expressed no fears
about a possible miscarriage of justice and were disinclined to bring the protections of due
process to these minors” (209).
First understood to be nearly irredeemably poor, dirty, and depraved, at risk in their
families, homes, and neighborhoods, these children served a use in affirming the middle-class’s
identity. They served an additional use: capable of redemption into productive members of
society, their transformation would valorize the efforts and virtues of those who saved them. And
they also could provide cheap - and in many cases free - labor to families, part of a project of
populating the West and affirming in America its conception of itself as a paternalistic and
redemptive nation. The marginalization of these children is illustrated poignantly in the
following images, the first of children residing in the New York Juvenile Asylum, and the
second of children sent West by the New York Juvenile Asylum, Children’s Aid Society, and
other charitable organizations:
[The perspective of a watchful eye and oversight] prompted the trustees of the New York Juvenile Asylum
to … prohibit the children from talking not only in their sleeping quarters but in the shops and the dining
room as well. (Rothman, 229)
At each stop, the group would disembark to be paraded before locals who, attracted by advertisements of
the orphans’ coming, had gathered with an eye to taking in a child. Those children who did not manage to
attract a foster parent would reboard and try again in the next town. (Nelson, 23)

What I endeavor to do in the final section is to correct the balance of the historical record,
if only by reconstructing what I can infer from the historical and archival record and imagining
empathetically the experience of the children who resided at the New York Juvenile Asylum and
were sent West from there.
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Poems
The Youngest in April Last by Accident in the Playground Fell
Application was made for the discharge of Mary Ann and John Peel, by father,
Three children were committed on account of the mothers intemperance, mother since
dead.
James the youngest, in April last, by accident in the playground, fell on some sharp
pointed stone, the injuries received were such and as in the opinion of Dr. Russ, and Dr.
Elliott Van Buren, who were called in by the Superintendent of the Asylum, as to render
his removal to the NY Hospital advisable, after being removed there he lingered until the
evening of Saturday last June 12th, when he died, the father saw the body of his son and
not having means to bury it himself gave his full and free consent for its burial by the
Hospital authorities. For more minute details of this case see report of Dr. Russ of this
date.
The father having represented that the Rev Mr. McLeod would take charge of John It was
ordered that he be surrendered upon the personal approval of that Rev Gentleman to
Superintendent.
He was forever falling as a child,
trying to walk before he could.
When mother was fit to get out the door
she’d stumble out to the street,
staunch the blood flowing from his forehead,
then drag him inside. More often
we got to him first, gave him the comfort
we could until he calmed. He only had eyes for
the two of us, his brother and sister, never the last step,
the curb, the bundle of wood left at the stoop.
No surprise really that he fell onto that stone
the snow had spent the week drawing back from.
How still he lay on the thawing ground. No flailing
or gut-howling like all those other times, but limb-splayed
as everything else - the teachers drawn into a run, the doctor,
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the fence that kept me from him and the younger boys,
the boys behind with sticks and balls idle in their hands pulsed with my heartbeats. At the hospital for two months
he lingered and I got to see him once in a row of beds
like ours, stayed late unseen, head bent into my cupped hands,
close enough to feel his cheek’s warmth in the dark
his unsteady breath. They told me back in the Asylum
between breakfast and work that he had died. And me?
After Father named his body, then left it the Hospital,
with full and free consent, he gave me over
to Reverend McLeod. The window of my room
looks into the alley where he lets me
feed the cats and dogs. He tells me that
the measure of the world is how it cares
for everything no matter how small,
tells me in the evenings about this world and the next,
which is his kind of kindness, I guess. Though next
is a hard thing to believe in, here in the playground
that is frozen again, here in what is behind me, here
in this wish for a body to keep falling,
even falling a kind of flight.

26

The Slipping Glass
Tuesday, December 5
Dr. Spalding called.
Mr. Jos. Fettretch furnished a stereopticon exhibition for the children tonight. Mr.
Patterson offered the children $25 in prizes for the 15 best descriptions of the views
exhibited.
William Robinson left the premises without permission and was returned to the Asylum
by outsiders.
Billy never did get his timing quite right,
so he fixed the watchman’s clock,
snuck through a hole in time and over the wall.
“There ain’t nothing quite like getting out of a place
to know what freedom is and isn’t, if you ask me,”
he’d say - but who asks any of us, and what does he know.
He’s never spent a night sleeping out.
He’s only here to get placed on some farm out West
where he can make something out of himself,
always on the lookout for something better,
but tonight he didn’t even see what the rest of us did:
Mr. Fetteretch’s stereopticon show.
I wish I could tell it so you could really see:
Niagara Falls, its strands of brushed lady’s hair;
three men in a metal sphere suspended
at the horizon of water; above a town in Italy,
a balloon sucking in its waist like a woman’s corset;
the sketch for an airship, a fish tip to tail, a banner for its fin.
But I can only describe all I can’t really imagine
by the little I’ve seen. Past the time William
should have come back the show kept going,
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Mr. Fettretch moving slides that had been still up to now.
The planets on their slow spin, like a horsecar’s wheels
just getting going. You should have heard the laughter
unpracticed tear out of us at seeing the sleeping man,
his mouth opening to swallow rats. Then Cinderella
sweeping the cellar, Cinderella at the ball, Cinderella,
her hand reaching back up the stairs, head turned
over her shoulder, for that slipper, the prince.
Last, John Gilpin’s ride, the tale of a buffoon
dragged 10 miles behind his horse in all that finery.
When Billy finally did come back, He’d been turned
into something else, wore shame on his face,
which didn’t fit him quite right. He wouldn’t
look at us, then couldn’t, in solitary for a day.
And then gave us his back all night,
not that we were allowed to speak in the sleeping quarters
anyways. We lay still, strove for sleep
in the din of all our resounding dreaming.
Darkness sidled up next to our heads,
said it would listen and did and by morning
had emptied us of dreams. Still I wanted
to tell someone, anyone, what I’d gotten to see.
Mr. Fettretch had brought me close to the machine.
His showman hands in kerosene light manipulated
the small pieces, the one fixed slide fixed,
the other moving and named in quiet speech
his words of conjure and transformation,
the slipping glass, the stones descending,
the glass pivot, the brass acrobatic, they,
like the images spun out above our heads,
the promise of another world.
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A Child This Day, Surrendered by Me
Part I
“in general, the mothers do not like to part with their children, even to get them in much
better situations”
- Charles Loring Brace
William
I’d never known a book so big
The first time I made my mark too lightly
So had to do it again and it began to look
Like I was worrying the place
Like a dog working a wound on its leg
That wouldn’t close no matter how much
She went over it with her tongue
The superintendent was kind
Put my name down gently and read
Aloud the promise I had made
We’d been written into a book before
William and me that night the streets
Had lain still the world listening loud we wondered
If it would snow but it never did and him in me
And then in the world the first surrender
And the first time I saw him I wept
For loving a thing more than anything
I could do for it Williams’ certificate of birth
Was a single page and the times I wonder if
We ever existed I suppose I can find us there
I guess all our days have been a kind of surrender
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To his stirring in the middle of the night
To his first steps out the door
To a love I could grow but never keep
I want you to know that this here
Is no kind of choice though is a kind of freedom
Knowing there’s nothing else I can do
Can’t keep him at work at the hotel
Can’t keep him in this room its cold stove
Its old mattress its dry goods box
Can’t write my name on these pages
Where I’ve learned how some pens stitch
And some sever
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A Child This Day Surrendered by Me
Part II
I, ______ the ______ of ______ a child this day surrendered by me to the New York
Juvenile Asylum, in accordance with the provisions of their Charter, hereby agree not to
interfere in any way in the management or control of said child, not to visit _____
without the consent of the Visiting Committee, and not to ask or receive any
compensation for ____ services, and in no way induce or endeavor to induce the said
child to leave the Asylum, or the family or station in which the Directors may have placed
___ or to leave the place in which ___ may have been apprenticed; and fater a trial of
three months, if the Directors of the Asylum shall from any cause see fit to return ___ I
hereby agree to receive ____ back.
In presence of
Dated, New-York, ______ 185_
Henry
The first day I spent answering
His only question: When is he coming back?
The second explaining that he’d have to go, too.
The third avoiding the clear mirror of his eyes,
Avoiding his touch, his hand clinging to the hem of my dress.
I didn’t know how I’d ever let go
If I got my arms around him once more.
This was a courage I’d never asked for, a matter of survival,
When we’d never really gotten the chance to live.
On this last day, I made my mark once more,
More practiced this time, wanting the mark to be
The book’s last, wanting to rule over what I knew
And that no other mother should - that you can bring a life
Into this world but maybe not through it Wanting to loosen the pages from their leather bindings
Into fields where they would wave, white flags there
Captured by shafts of grass.
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That night a dream hung over
The lake of my sleep. We are riding
A horsecar north into untracked land,
Land without device or design,
And in my memory of the dream
I know that soon we will arrive
To the last of this island
Where it softens into reeds and salt marsh,
The place between the ridges.
They will roll up their pant legs
And hunt for oysters and leave
For moments footprints in the mud
That forgives their soft soles
Before we can arrive,
The dream begins to clear
At the sun’s first soft hand.
The last I see are the boys
Hanging over the back of the horsecar.
They are tearing off
Small scraps from the newspaper
They lined their coats with,
The breeze drawing the scraps out of their hands,
And as we whip by,
They bend their heads over their palms,
Whisper into the wind’s ear
To make a wish, a wish, now gone.
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Narrative Description of Capstone and Methodology
Process of Development and Impetus for Capstone
Behind our apartment a small wood provides a slight buffer between three large
institutions: the school where I live and teach, the elementary school my children attend, and a
residential treatment facility for troubled children. The wood is marked by tall trees that form a
canopy far overhead and little undergrowth. The deer that make these woods their home have
ravaged new growth and small bushes. Soil erosion results, and we occasionally find tall trees
toppled across the path to school. Red-tailed hawks hunt gladly for small creatures that lack
shelter. We stumble over rounded stones that suggest the road that once labored from town up
the hill to a farm, whose root cellar still holds its shape under the forest floor. When my daughter
was invited to bring something for show-n-tell to school, she chose a brick she’d found in the
woods; it was very “artifact-y.”
On the walk to school we emerge by one of the buildings that is part of the sprawling 180
acre residential facility Children’s Village. It is a small blue farmhouse, marked by occasional
institutional indicators: close-circuit camera, a steel door, a small sign naming the house. The
cars parked in the driveway name their allegiances to private security services and, more
recently, the Department of Homeland Security. For a number of recent years, Children’s Village
has interned children separated from their parents at the crossing of the border of Mexico and the
United States. This is an old institution, formerly the New York Juvenile Asylum, founded in
1851 in Washington Heights by philanthropists concerned for and by the increasing number of
destitute children on the streets of New York.
My interest in Children’s Village began by virtue of proximity of place: What did it mean
that this institution that moves children away from families in New York City and its environs
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sits right next to my children’s suburban public school and right next to my school and home?
And my interest grew by virtue of proximity of time: How much of the current US policy of
separating children from their detained migrant parents or deported immigrant parents could be
explained by considering the asylum movement in New York City in the mid 19th century?
What did it mean that the same institution that once separated from their families and housed
children in 19th century New York City now separates children from their families and houses
them today? What could this single site reveal about a larger historical and ideological
framework that continues to exist in this nation today?
While these proximities of place and history compelled me, ultimately it was a proximity
of experience - an empathy - that compelled me most. A teacher and writer of poetry, I have been
deeply moved by collections and poems that construct an intimate, empathetic relationship
between reader and subject through persona poems, often called dramatic monologues: poems
conceived by a poet in the voice of an historical or literary figure. Examples that serve as
inspirations for this project include: Molly McCully Brown’s The Virginia State Colony for
Epileptics and Feeble-Minded, Julia Bouwsma’s Midden, Gabrielle Calvocoressi’s The Last
Time I Saw Amelia Earhart and Apocalyptic Swing, Tyehimba Jess’s Leadbelly, and Adrian
Matejka’s The Big Smoke, as well as shorter works, such as Frank Bidart’s “Ellen West,” Patricia
Smith’s “The President Flies Over,” Sylvia Plath’s “Lady Lazarus,” and H.D.’s “Eurydice.”
These collections and poems conjure through the persona’s voice the sense of historical
characters as real, credible, and worthy of an empathetic relationship through the poems’ use of
image, dialect, and details, which are often meticulously researched. So I was interested to
conjure this kind of empathetic relationship for myself and any reader of the poems by writing
persona poems in the voice of children who formerly resided in the New York Juvenile Asylum.
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This project, though, had a number of potential problems associated with it: namely the
ethical problem of a person of power and privilege representing the experiences of children with
less power and privilege in creative work. So there existed an array of questions I wished to
consider in this project: Who gets to speak about and for historical figures? Under what
particular conditions? How should an artist calculate and take into account the particular
asymmetrical power relationships between themselves and their subjects?
In summary, this capstone project unfolded in three parts: research that endeavored to
help me construct an ethics of representation appropriate to this project; research that situated the
New York Juvenile Asylum and its residents in a particular ideological and historical context;
and a series of persona poems in the voice of residents of the New York Juvenile Asylum (now
known as Children’s Village).

Best Practices to Achieve Project Goals
I employed an array of practices to work toward the completion of my capstone.
Beginning with a careful reading of model texts helped clarify what I was aiming for - in
language, content, and form - in my own writing. Reading model texts throughout the process
continued to help me hear the kind of language and voices I hoped to conjure in my own work.
Interviewing some of the writers of the model collections helped deepen my understanding of
their process, their challenges, and their strategies.
Next I turned to the literature addressing the ethics of representation in an effort to test
and clarify the right I had to represent the voices and experiences of these historical figures. I did
not feel able to write a single poem until I had resolved for myself my right to represent and the
ethics I would try to honor as I represented experiences different from my own.
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Part of the responsibility I felt in crafting these poems was to ground them in an historical
situation that felt credible, or, at least, plausible. Reading histories about New York City in the
mid-19th century and secondary sources that helped contextualize charitable responses to the
poor at this time allowed me to construct an historical and theoretical framework in which I
could situate the experiences of the individuals I would write about. The archival material thousands of pages of lists, notes, journal entries, correspondence, even gradebooks - of the New
York Juvenile Asylum, carefully guarded and tended by the staff at the Columbia Rare Book and
Manuscript Library, provided invaluable insight: small windows into the lives of these children
and their caretakers, traces of their everyday, lived humanity.

Methodology for Writing Persona Poems
While my method was not necessarily linear, it always began in the same way, with a
hunt for language - a snippet, a phrase, a situation pointed to - that would give me a narrow and
specific insight into the lived experience of a child or their mother. Archival, historical, and
theoretical texts equally made for good hunting ground. In some ways, this process of searching
for a small way into a poem resembled one of the larger aspirations of the project: to find a
particular child in the midst of all that archival, historical, and theoretical material. And so I read
for details that were so small and specific they pointed to a specific life, a specific situation. In
some ways, the absence of the voice of the children, in both the historical and archival materials,
gave me a certain degree of freedom to imagine and construct an experience or situation for the
speakers of the poems. My writing was governed more by principles of plausibility than
accuracy, the illusion of the real.

36

With the speaker and situation sketched, I could then try to clarify and develop what
larger conceptual issue the poem might speak to, an issue that might derive from the theory of
charity and poverty I researched. But what seemed, again and again, to dominate my thinking in
my effort to represent these characters was my responsible to conceive of a credible and
compelling psychological complexity for the speaker to inhabit.
Occasionally the poems contain metafictive elements, elements that draw attention to
their natures as constructed, written things. Drafts of poems I decided not to include in this
capstone borrow aspects of their form from the form of the archives (if part of the archive
contained lists, the poem might do so as well, for example). And the voice of the poems modern but occasionally informed by historical diction language or terms - should raise the
reader’s awareness of the author’s presence and situation in time in the poem. The poems are
framed by an excerpt or excerpts from the archive or an historical sources; many of the poems
contain an image of paper or documentation that alludes to the archive and its representation of
the characters in the poem. And in some cases, the poems address the reader explicitly in an
effort to wake up the reader to an ethical relationship to the subject in which they might be
implicated.
Lastly, I tried, throughout, to listen to when I was present in the poem, to acknowledge
how my experience and position might be placing pressure on the experience of the represented
subject. I tried to honor the historical, psychological, and narrative integrity of the speaker. But,
of course, I am sure that I am all over the poems in ways I do not even understand.

Relationship of Capstone to Concentrations and Courses
The capstone provided me a chance to synthesize my thinking in an array of courses and
two concentrations, Life Writing and New York Studies.
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● In my Introduction to Liberal Studies course with Rachel Brownstein, we read The
Emigrants by W.G. Sebald, one of my favorite writers, and I thought a lot and wrote
about issues of metafiction and how metafiction might have helped Sebald resolve some
of the thornier questions related to the ethics of representing the Holocaust, particularly
given his historical position (his father was a soldier in the German Army; his family
never discussed, nor really told him, about his father’s experience nor the Holocaust
generally).
● In David Brotherton’s course, Studies of Youth: Marginalization and Resistance, I first
encountered theory that deconstructed representations of criminalized and marginalized
youth.
● Many conversations in my “Teaching Race and Gender Theory in the Undergraduate
Classroom” concerned representation and its ethics; many conversations in my “Speaking
Truth to Power” concerned power and rhetoric.
● And while I was intrigued by the discussions about the ethics of representation in
biography, autobiography, and memoir that we had in Life Writing concentration classes,
I was not entirely satisfied by their premises about representation, accuracy, and the
difference between non-fiction and fiction. So I was glad to have the chance to deepen
my thinking about those issues here.
● Siraj Ahmed’s course, “The Rights of the Refugee,” conveyed the theoretical and
material urgency of the rights of the vulnerable in ways that crystallized the need to do
this work and its shape.
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Evaluation of Project
In many ways I am pleased with the project, particularly with the way in which the
poems are grounded in my researching and thinking about both the ethics of representation and
the history of New York City and its charitable movements. And my trips to research the New
York Juvenile Asylum archive at Columbia University totally excited me about archival work,
which I had never done before, and encouraged me to continue to use primary sources in my
writing.
I have reservations about my work, though. I had hoped to write more poems, but my
pacing led me to spend more time researching and reading theory and history than writing. And
in writing fewer poems than I intended I risk essentializing the children and their parents: the
variety of their experiences is not reflected in the poems. I also have some questions about the
aesthetics of my poems: whether or not I should have created the voices for the characters that I
did; and whether or not I should have pushed toward a more lyrical style in the poems (I have
concerns that the long narrative poems read as anxious in their effort to include historical context
and information).
Lastly, when I return to Williams’ reading of Ai, I cannot help but feel I have fallen short
of the standard her work sets for persona poetry: “She refuses to go for the easy idea of a
situation or the expected stereotype of her chosen voice” (emphasis mine).

Continuation of the Project
All that said, a sense has been emerging for a little while now that I might have the germ
of a book here. While only five finished poems appear here, I have the conceit for many more
poems. The book, as I am currently conceiving of it, would have four sections: the first,
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autobiographical poems of family and domestic life; the second, the persona poems that appear
here; the third, persona poems in the voice of children who were sent West; and the fourth,
poems about the humanitarian and ethical crisis unfolding at the southern border of this country,
as America wrests children from the arms of their parents seeking asylum. As the setting of the
poems in the collection would move from domestic space to foreign border, it would manifest
the aspirational trajectory of empathy and imagination. And the poems would be thematically
organized by the ideas of asylum in its incarnation in mid-nineteenth century New York City and
in its current incarnation in today’s America.
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Appendix
The title of this capstone comes from a quotation by Natasha Saje, cited in the body of the
capstone itself.
“The Youngest in April Last by Accident in the Playground Fell” takes its title from and contains
notes transcribed from the Administrative Records, 1853-1954, in the archives of New York
Juvenile Asylum.
“The Slipping Glass” contains notes transcribed from the Administrative Records, 1853-1954, in
the archives of New York Juvenile Asylum; alludes to entries in the Daily Log, November 1,
1899 - December 18, 1902 in the archives of New York Juvenile Asylum; alludes to stereopticon
images from the digital collections of the New York Public Library; and depends upon the
terrific resources of the Magical Lantern Society, found at http://www.magiclanternsociety.org/.
“A Child This Day, Surrendered by Me, Part I” takes its title and situation from forms in the
Parent Surrender diary, 1853 - 1860, in the archives of the New York Juvenile Asylum; contains
a quotation from C.L. Brace’s attributed by Claudia Nelson, author of Little Strangers to the film
The Orphan Trains (2006); and alludes to details found in the General Operations Records, 1853
- 1950 in the archives of New York Juvenile Asylum.
“A Child This Day, Surrendered by Me, Part II” contains language and information (including
the translation of the Native American word for Inwood shorakapok as “the place between
ridges”) from the Welikia Project curriculum (https://welikia.org/) about the original ecology of
Manhattan; and refers to information about children Brace sought to rescue found in Howard
Husock’s article “Uplifting the ‘Dangerous Classes.’”
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